--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp Fri Sep 17 09:02:29 2010 +0300
@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
+ * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "SecurityOrigin.h"
+
+#include "Document.h"
+#include "KURL.h"
+#include "OriginAccessEntry.h"
+#include "SchemeRegistry.h"
+#include <wtf/StdLibExtras.h>
+
+namespace WebCore {
+
+static SecurityOrigin::LocalLoadPolicy localLoadPolicy = SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly;
+
+typedef Vector<OriginAccessEntry> OriginAccessWhiteList;
+typedef HashMap<String, OriginAccessWhiteList*> OriginAccessMap;
+
+static OriginAccessMap& originAccessMap()
+{
+ DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(OriginAccessMap, originAccessMap, ());
+ return originAccessMap;
+}
+
+static bool schemeRequiresAuthority(const String& scheme)
+{
+ DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(URLSchemesMap, schemes, ());
+
+ if (schemes.isEmpty()) {
+ schemes.add("http");
+ schemes.add("https");
+ schemes.add("ftp");
+ }
+
+ return schemes.contains(scheme);
+}
+
+
+SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags)
+ : m_sandboxFlags(sandboxFlags)
+ , m_protocol(url.protocol().isNull() ? "" : url.protocol().lower())
+ , m_host(url.host().isNull() ? "" : url.host().lower())
+ , m_port(url.port())
+ , m_isUnique(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) || SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsNoAccess(m_protocol))
+ , m_universalAccess(true)
+ , m_domainWasSetInDOM(false)
+ , m_enforceFilePathSeparation(false)
+{
+ // These protocols do not create security origins; the owner frame provides the origin
+ if (m_protocol == "about" || m_protocol == "javascript")
+ m_protocol = "";
+
+ // For edge case URLs that were probably misparsed, make sure that the origin is unique.
+ if (schemeRequiresAuthority(m_protocol) && m_host.isEmpty())
+ m_isUnique = true;
+
+ // document.domain starts as m_host, but can be set by the DOM.
+ m_domain = m_host;
+
+ // By default, only local SecurityOrigins can load local resources.
+ m_canLoadLocalResources = isLocal();
+ if (m_canLoadLocalResources) {
+ // Directories should never be readable.
+ if (!url.hasPath() || url.path().endsWith("/"))
+ m_isUnique = true;
+ // Store the path in case we are doing per-file origin checking.
+ m_filePath = url.path();
+ }
+
+ if (isDefaultPortForProtocol(m_port, m_protocol))
+ m_port = 0;
+}
+
+SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other)
+ : m_sandboxFlags(other->m_sandboxFlags)
+ , m_protocol(other->m_protocol.threadsafeCopy())
+ , m_host(other->m_host.threadsafeCopy())
+ , m_encodedHost(other->m_encodedHost.threadsafeCopy())
+ , m_domain(other->m_domain.threadsafeCopy())
+ , m_filePath(other->m_filePath.threadsafeCopy())
+ , m_port(other->m_port)
+ , m_isUnique(other->m_isUnique)
+ , m_universalAccess(true)
+ , m_domainWasSetInDOM(other->m_domainWasSetInDOM)
+ , m_canLoadLocalResources(other->m_canLoadLocalResources)
+ , m_enforceFilePathSeparation(other->m_enforceFilePathSeparation)
+{
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isEmpty() const
+{
+ return m_protocol.isEmpty();
+}
+
+PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::create(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags)
+{
+ if (!url.isValid())
+ return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(KURL(), sandboxFlags));
+ return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(url, sandboxFlags));
+}
+
+PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createEmpty()
+{
+ return create(KURL());
+}
+
+PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::threadsafeCopy()
+{
+ return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(this));
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::setDomainFromDOM(const String& newDomain)
+{
+ m_domainWasSetInDOM = true;
+ m_domain = newDomain.lower();
+}
+
+static HashSet<String>& schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation()
+{
+ DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(HashSet<String>, schemes, ());
+ return schemes;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::setDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(bool forbidden, const String& scheme)
+{
+ if (scheme.isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ if (forbidden)
+ schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().add(scheme);
+ else
+ schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().remove(scheme);
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(const String& scheme)
+{
+ if (scheme.isEmpty())
+ return false;
+
+ return schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().contains(scheme);
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::canAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other) const
+{
+ if (m_universalAccess)
+ return true;
+
+ if (isUnique() || other->isUnique())
+ return false;
+
+ // Here are two cases where we should permit access:
+ //
+ // 1) Neither document has set document.domain. In this case, we insist
+ // that the scheme, host, and port of the URLs match.
+ //
+ // 2) Both documents have set document.domain. In this case, we insist
+ // that the documents have set document.domain to the same value and
+ // that the scheme of the URLs match.
+ //
+ // This matches the behavior of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 6.
+ //
+ // Internet Explorer 7 and Opera 9 are more strict in that they require
+ // the port numbers to match when both pages have document.domain set.
+ //
+ // FIXME: Evaluate whether we can tighten this policy to require matched
+ // port numbers.
+ //
+ // Opera 9 allows access when only one page has set document.domain, but
+ // this is a security vulnerability.
+
+ bool canAccess = false;
+ if (m_protocol == other->m_protocol) {
+ if (!m_domainWasSetInDOM && !other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) {
+ if (m_host == other->m_host && m_port == other->m_port)
+ canAccess = true;
+ } else if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) {
+ if (m_domain == other->m_domain)
+ canAccess = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (canAccess && isLocal())
+ canAccess = passesFileCheck(other);
+
+ return canAccess;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::passesFileCheck(const SecurityOrigin* other) const
+{
+ ASSERT(isLocal() && other->isLocal());
+
+ if (!m_enforceFilePathSeparation && !other->m_enforceFilePathSeparation)
+ return true;
+
+ return (m_filePath == other->m_filePath);
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::canRequest(const KURL& url) const
+{
+ if (m_universalAccess)
+ return true;
+
+ if (isUnique())
+ return false;
+
+ RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> targetOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url);
+ if (targetOrigin->isUnique())
+ return false;
+
+ // We call isSameSchemeHostPort here instead of canAccess because we want
+ // to ignore document.domain effects.
+ if (isSameSchemeHostPort(targetOrigin.get()))
+ return true;
+
+ if (isAccessWhiteListed(targetOrigin.get()))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::taintsCanvas(const KURL& url) const
+{
+ if (canRequest(url))
+ return false;
+
+ // This function exists because we treat data URLs as having a unique origin,
+ // contrary to the current (9/19/2009) draft of the HTML5 specification.
+ // We still want to let folks paint data URLs onto untainted canvases, so
+ // we special case data URLs below. If we change to match HTML5 w.r.t.
+ // data URL security, then we can remove this function in favor of
+ // !canRequest.
+ if (url.protocolIs("data"))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isAccessWhiteListed(const SecurityOrigin* targetOrigin) const
+{
+ if (OriginAccessWhiteList* list = originAccessMap().get(toString())) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < list->size(); ++i) {
+ if (list->at(i).matchesOrigin(*targetOrigin))
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::canLoad(const KURL& url, const String& referrer, Document* document)
+{
+ if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLAsLocal(url.string()))
+ return true;
+
+ // If we were provided a document, we first check if the access has been white listed.
+ // Then we let its local file police dictate the result.
+ // Otherwise we allow local loads only if the supplied referrer is also local.
+ if (document) {
+ SecurityOrigin* documentOrigin = document->securityOrigin();
+ RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> targetOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url);
+ if (documentOrigin->isAccessWhiteListed(targetOrigin.get()))
+ return true;
+ return documentOrigin->canLoadLocalResources();
+ }
+ if (!referrer.isEmpty())
+ return SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLAsLocal(referrer);
+ return false;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::grantLoadLocalResources()
+{
+ // This function exists only to support backwards compatibility with older
+ // versions of WebKit. Granting privileges to some, but not all, documents
+ // in a SecurityOrigin is a security hazard because the documents without
+ // the privilege can obtain the privilege by injecting script into the
+ // documents that have been granted the privilege.
+ ASSERT(allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal());
+ m_canLoadLocalResources = true;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::grantUniversalAccess()
+{
+ m_universalAccess = true;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::enforceFilePathSeparation()
+{
+ ASSERT(isLocal());
+ m_enforceFilePathSeparation = true;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isLocal() const
+{
+ return SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(m_protocol);
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const
+{
+ // New window created by the application
+ if (isEmpty())
+ return true;
+
+ RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> other = SecurityOrigin::create(url);
+ return canAccess(other.get());
+}
+
+String SecurityOrigin::toString() const
+{
+ if (isEmpty())
+ return "null";
+
+ if (isUnique())
+ return "null";
+
+ if (m_protocol == "file") {
+ if (m_enforceFilePathSeparation)
+ return "null";
+ return "file://";
+ }
+
+ Vector<UChar> result;
+ result.reserveInitialCapacity(m_protocol.length() + m_host.length() + 10);
+ append(result, m_protocol);
+ append(result, "://");
+ append(result, m_host);
+
+ if (m_port) {
+ append(result, ":");
+ append(result, String::number(m_port));
+ }
+
+ return String::adopt(result);
+}
+
+PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createFromString(const String& originString)
+{
+ return SecurityOrigin::create(KURL(KURL(), originString));
+}
+
+static const char SeparatorCharacter = '_';
+
+PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createFromDatabaseIdentifier(const String& databaseIdentifier)
+{
+ // Make sure there's a first separator
+ int separator1 = databaseIdentifier.find(SeparatorCharacter);
+ if (separator1 == -1)
+ return create(KURL());
+
+ // Make sure there's a second separator
+ int separator2 = databaseIdentifier.reverseFind(SeparatorCharacter);
+ if (separator2 == -1)
+ return create(KURL());
+
+ // Ensure there were at least 2 separator characters. Some hostnames on intranets have
+ // underscores in them, so we'll assume that any additional underscores are part of the host.
+ if (separator1 == separator2)
+ return create(KURL());
+
+ // Make sure the port section is a valid port number or doesn't exist
+ bool portOkay;
+ int port = databaseIdentifier.right(databaseIdentifier.length() - separator2 - 1).toInt(&portOkay);
+ bool portAbsent = (separator2 == static_cast<int>(databaseIdentifier.length()) - 1);
+ if (!(portOkay || portAbsent))
+ return create(KURL());
+
+ if (port < 0 || port > 65535)
+ return create(KURL());
+
+ // Split out the 3 sections of data
+ String protocol = databaseIdentifier.substring(0, separator1);
+ String host = databaseIdentifier.substring(separator1 + 1, separator2 - separator1 - 1);
+
+ host = decodeURLEscapeSequences(host);
+ return create(KURL(KURL(), protocol + "://" + host + ":" + String::number(port)));
+}
+
+// The following lower-ASCII characters need escaping to be used in a filename
+// across all systems, including Windows:
+// - Unprintable ASCII (00-1F)
+// - Space (20)
+// - Double quote (22)
+// - Percent (25) (escaped because it is our escape character)
+// - Asterisk (2A)
+// - Slash (2F)
+// - Colon (3A)
+// - Less-than (3C)
+// - Greater-than (3E)
+// - Question Mark (3F)
+// - Backslash (5C)
+// - Pipe (7C)
+// - Delete (7F)
+
+static const bool needsEscaping[128] = {
+ /* 00-07 */ true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true,
+ /* 08-0F */ true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true,
+
+ /* 10-17 */ true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true,
+ /* 18-1F */ true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true,
+
+ /* 20-27 */ true, false, true, false, false, true, false, false,
+ /* 28-2F */ false, false, true, false, false, false, false, true,
+
+ /* 30-37 */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+ /* 38-3F */ false, false, true, false, true, false, true, true,
+
+ /* 40-47 */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+ /* 48-4F */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+
+ /* 50-57 */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+ /* 58-5F */ false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false,
+
+ /* 60-67 */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+ /* 68-6F */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+
+ /* 70-77 */ false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,
+ /* 78-7F */ false, false, false, false, true, false, false, true,
+};
+
+static inline bool shouldEscapeUChar(UChar c)
+{
+ return c > 127 ? false : needsEscaping[c];
+}
+
+static const char hexDigits[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+static String encodedHost(const String& host)
+{
+ unsigned length = host.length();
+ Vector<UChar, 512> buffer(length * 3 + 1);
+ UChar* p = buffer.data();
+
+ const UChar* str = host.characters();
+ const UChar* strEnd = str + length;
+
+ while (str < strEnd) {
+ UChar c = *str++;
+ if (shouldEscapeUChar(c)) {
+ *p++ = '%';
+ *p++ = hexDigits[(c >> 4) & 0xF];
+ *p++ = hexDigits[c & 0xF];
+ } else
+ *p++ = c;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT(p - buffer.data() <= static_cast<int>(buffer.size()));
+
+ return String(buffer.data(), p - buffer.data());
+}
+
+String SecurityOrigin::databaseIdentifier() const
+{
+ String separatorString(&SeparatorCharacter, 1);
+
+ if (m_encodedHost.isEmpty())
+ m_encodedHost = encodedHost(m_host);
+
+ return m_protocol + separatorString + m_encodedHost + separatorString + String::number(m_port);
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::equal(const SecurityOrigin* other) const
+{
+ if (other == this)
+ return true;
+
+ if (!isSameSchemeHostPort(other))
+ return false;
+
+ if (m_domainWasSetInDOM != other->m_domainWasSetInDOM)
+ return false;
+
+ if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && m_domain != other->m_domain)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::isSameSchemeHostPort(const SecurityOrigin* other) const
+{
+ if (m_host != other->m_host)
+ return false;
+
+ if (m_protocol != other->m_protocol)
+ return false;
+
+ if (m_port != other->m_port)
+ return false;
+
+ if (isLocal() && !passesFileCheck(other))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::shouldHideReferrer(const KURL& url, const String& referrer)
+{
+ bool referrerIsSecureURL = protocolIs(referrer, "https");
+ bool referrerIsWebURL = referrerIsSecureURL || protocolIs(referrer, "http");
+
+ if (!referrerIsWebURL)
+ return true;
+
+ if (!referrerIsSecureURL)
+ return false;
+
+ bool URLIsSecureURL = url.protocolIs("https");
+
+ return !URLIsSecureURL;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::setLocalLoadPolicy(LocalLoadPolicy policy)
+{
+ localLoadPolicy = policy;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::restrictAccessToLocal()
+{
+ return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForAll;
+}
+
+bool SecurityOrigin::allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal()
+{
+ return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::addOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(const SecurityOrigin& sourceOrigin, const String& destinationProtocol, const String& destinationDomains, bool allowDestinationSubdomains)
+{
+ ASSERT(isMainThread());
+ ASSERT(!sourceOrigin.isEmpty());
+ if (sourceOrigin.isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ String sourceString = sourceOrigin.toString();
+ pair<OriginAccessMap::iterator, bool> result = originAccessMap().add(sourceString, 0);
+ if (result.second)
+ result.first->second = new OriginAccessWhiteList;
+
+ OriginAccessWhiteList* list = result.first->second;
+ list->append(OriginAccessEntry(destinationProtocol, destinationDomains, allowDestinationSubdomains ? OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains : OriginAccessEntry::DisallowSubdomains));
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::removeOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(const SecurityOrigin& sourceOrigin, const String& destinationProtocol, const String& destinationDomains, bool allowDestinationSubdomains)
+{
+ ASSERT(isMainThread());
+ ASSERT(!sourceOrigin.isEmpty());
+ if (sourceOrigin.isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ String sourceString = sourceOrigin.toString();
+ OriginAccessMap& map = originAccessMap();
+ OriginAccessMap::iterator it = map.find(sourceString);
+ if (it == map.end())
+ return;
+
+ OriginAccessWhiteList* list = it->second;
+ size_t index = list->find(OriginAccessEntry(destinationProtocol, destinationDomains, allowDestinationSubdomains ? OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains : OriginAccessEntry::DisallowSubdomains));
+ if (index == notFound)
+ return;
+
+ list->remove(index);
+
+ if (!list->isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ map.remove(it);
+ delete list;
+}
+
+void SecurityOrigin::resetOriginAccessWhitelists()
+{
+ ASSERT(isMainThread());
+ OriginAccessMap& map = originAccessMap();
+ deleteAllValues(map);
+ map.clear();
+}
+
+} // namespace WebCore